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THE U.S. MILITARY AND THE EVOLVING CHALLENGES
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Anthony H. Cordesman
The U.S. armed forces have long faced challenges in the Middle East, and theyhave generally done so with considerable success. The attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 did not create a radically
new set of problems in the Middle East for services that had already experienced
attacks on the Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon, punished terrorism by attacks
on Libya, fought over a decade of asymmetric warfare with Iraq, and suffered
from terrorist bombings at the National Guard Training Center and the
al-Khobar barracks in Saudi Arabia and on the USS Cole (DDG 67) in Yemen.
Neither 11 September nor the war in Afghanistan has made fundamental
changes in U.S. interests in the Middle East or changed the basic strategic ratio-
nale behind the American military presence in the
Gulf and the eastern Mediterranean. If anything, what
is now called the “war on terrorism” exposed the
depth of the challenges that have been evolving for
many years, as well as the risks the United States will
face if it does not come to grips with the security prob-
lems of the Middle East.
Terrorism and asymmetric warfare are clearly part
of that challenge, but only part. We still confront
the problems of protecting a key source of the
world’s energy supplies, supporting Arab allies and
Israel, securing sea lines of communication, and
dealing with weapons proliferation. We still face the
risks of major regional contingencies and of war with
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Iraq, and possibly Iran. Terrorism and asymmetric warfare simply add new
dimensions.
ENERGY EXPORTS AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION
The Middle East may represent a significant part of the global terrorist threat to
the United States, as well as of the threat posed by asymmetric warfare, but we
need to remember what our key strategic priorities are. The United States is ever
more dependent on a globalized economy, and the global economy is becoming
steadily more dependent on Middle Eastern energy exports.
We tend to take this dependence so thoroughly for granted that we sometimes
fail to consider how important it is and how much it is estimated to grow in the
future. There also is a tendency to view the issue in terms of American import
dependence, our normal peacetime reliance on given countries for imports, and
dependence on direct imports. These are all false approaches to the problem. We
are steadily more dependent on global imports; therefore, what affects the global
economy affects us.
Specifically, our level of direct imports is no measure of our strategic depen-
dence. We compete for oil on a world market. Any shortage or price rise in a cri-
sis forces us to compete for imports on the same basis as every other nation.
Focusing on direct imports of oil ignores the fact that the United States has
shifted its manufactured imports to include energy-dependent goods, particu-
larly from Asia. These, in turn, are produced by economies that are critically de-
pendent on oil obtained from the Middle East. Estimates of import dependence
that include only direct imports of crude and refined products understate our
true net dependence on oil imports to the point of analytical absurdity.
The New Level of Strategic Dependence on Energy Exports
To put this in perspective, the Gulf region alone has two-thirds of the world’s
proven oil reserves. The U.S. government estimates that Saudi Arabia sits atop at
least 262 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, 25.4 percent of the world supply.
This compares with 11 percent for Iraq, 9.6 percent for the United Arab
Emirates, 9.2 percent for Kuwait, 8.6 percent for Iran, 13 percent for the rest of
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and 23.2 percent
for all of the rest of the world.
These reserves make the Persian Gulf the one region in the Middle East that is
a truly vital American strategic interest, although the United States does have
major strategic interests in friends like Israel and Egypt. The sheer scale of Gulf
oil reserves explains why the Department of Energy estimates that the region’s
oil exports will have to rise by 125 percent between 2000 and 2020 to meet the
world’s need for energy. The department also estimates that Gulf producers will
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account for more than 45 percent of worldwide trade by 2002—reaching this
percentage for the first time since the early 1980s. The Gulf share of worldwide
petroleum exports is projected to increase gradually after 2002 to almost 60 per-
cent by 2020. The impact on key countries is illustrated by the fact that the De-
partment of Energy estimates that Saudi oil production capacity must rise from
14.5 percent of all world export capacity in 2000 to 19.2 percent of that capacity
by 2020.
These figures do not take account of the facts that the Middle East also has
roughly 40 percent of all the world’s gas reserves, some 35 percent of which are
in the Gulf, and that similar increases must take place in gas exports. They do not
account for world demographic trends that ensure that total Middle Eastern
exports must also rise. They do not show that most importers have few or no
strategic reserves and are increasingly dependent on a constant and predictable
flow of oil and gas. Finally, they cannot take account of the fact that most of the
growth in petroleum exports will go to nations that can be reached only by
tanker and not by pipeline.
The growth in world dependence on imported oil and gas will also be accom-
panied by major changes in the world energy market, as a result of which the
Middle East will export more and more highly specialized kinds of products that
end users will be unable easily to replace. It means in addition that today’s ports
must be massively expanded, that tanker and cargo ship movements must vastly
increase, and that the industrialized world will become more and more depen-
dent on the timeliness and continuity of these ships’ movement through the
world’s sea-lanes.
The Military Challenge
Even today, most ports are highly vulnerable; many oil facilities are near coast-
lines or in relatively exposed inland areas; and a handful of maritime choke
points are of critical strategic importance. Between three and 3.3 million barrels
per day move through the Bab al Mandab, at the southeastern end of the Red
Sea; about fifteen million move through the Strait of Hormuz at the exit from
the Persian Gulf; and more than three million barrels a day move through the
Suez Canal. This involves roughly 240 tanker movements a month through the
Red Sea and over 1,400 passages by tankers and petroleum-product-carrying
ships through the Strait of Hormuz, plus a vast number of voyages of additional
cargo ships. If the Department of Energy projections are correct, these figures
must triple by 2020.
At the same time, however, more and more nations will acquire long-range
and highly sophisticated antiship missiles, strike and maritime patrol aircraft,
submarines, and mines. They will acquire weapons of mass destruction,
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long-range cruise missiles, and precision ground-attack missiles that can be
used against port and oil facilities or key points of vulnerability, like desalination
plants. The very meaning of “choke point” is changing as regional powers ac-
quire longer-range strike systems, the ability to hit sources of enemy exports,
and better sensor and targeting systems.
Equally important, terrorist and asymmetric attacks are likely to involve
better planning about what targets to destroy, what installations are most costly
or have the longest replacement lead-times, and what casualties and damage are
the most politically sensitive. The use of chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear (CBRN) weapons is becoming increasingly possible, and so are attacks
to produce the maximum disruptive effect or lasting levels of contamination in
key facilities, with corresponding impacts on the world oil market.
Aside from the United States, no combination of powers inside or outside the
Persian Gulf region has the military presence, power-projection capabilities,
force levels, or technology to protect the sources of Middle Eastern energy ex-
ports, ensure the global flow of energy exports, and deny hostile states the ability
to attack or blackmail exporting states. Only the United States can hope to adapt
to the strategic challenges involved or provide the necessary military power. No
other country can link such power to a mix of joint and coalition warfare capa-
bilities, or provide steadily higher levels of heavy and light land power, air and
missile power, antisubmarine and mine warfare, escort, maritime surveillance,
air defense, and missile-defense capabilities. No other nation can provide an in-
tegrated defense against asymmetric attacks by forces like the Naval Branch of
the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. No other nation has any serious prospect of
deterring and defending against the use of CBRN weapons.
Yes, defense of energy facilities and exports is an old mission, virtually a stra-
tegic cliché. It lacks the glamour of, and the attention being paid to, terrorism
per se. The fact is, however, that the scale and importance of the energy mission
will expand radically over the next few decades; the question, therefore, is
whether the U.S. military services, particularly the Navy and Marine Corps, have
fully reexamined these changes and made plans to adjust their capabilities. If
they have, we must say they have done so with far more stealth than has ever
been achieved by a B-2B or F-117A. If anything, the current success of the U.S.
forces in the region, particularly of the Fifth and Sixth Fleets, may have to some
extent removed from the American military agenda the need for highly detailed
force and operational planning. The fact remains, nevertheless, that the only vi-
tal U.S. strategic interest in the region is the security of energy facilities and ex-
ports. Fundamental strategic interests still matter.
C O R D E S M A N 7 5
4
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/3
CHANGES IN THE REGIONAL STRATEGIC CLIMATE
At the same time, the U.S. military does face newer challenges, challenges that
are more directly related to terrorism and asymmetric warfare. Over the years,
the American armed forces have developed an enviable mix of forward bases, ex-
ercise and training activities, advisory efforts, port calls, and other aspects of
military presence in the Mediterranean and Red Seas, North Africa, the Levant,
and around the Persian Gulf. Many of these arrangements have survived crises
in relations with nations in the region, including those arising from the influ-
ence of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, from Arab nationalism, and
from the oil embargo following the October War in 1973. The United States has
steadily strengthened its presence in the Gulf since the “tanker war” with Iran
that began in 1986, a development greatly reinforced by DESERT STORM and by
the continuing threat posed by Iran and Iraq.
Ironically, however, maintaining that military presence and a rapid power-
projection capability may be becoming more difficult, just when it is becoming
more necessary. The aftermath of the attacks of 11 September—enormously ex-
acerbated by the Palestinian crisis—have exposed tensions between the United
States and its Arab friends and allies, as well as a popular hostility to the United
States that is considerably deeper than many American analysts had estimated.
The tensions involved affect the entire region and a wide range of issues. As a re-
sult, it seems useful to discuss each of the major challenges the United States
faces in maintaining its forward presence in the Gulf, as well as the best- and
worst-case situations that may result.
The “Clash within a Civilization”?
Western fears of a clash between civilizations are only a side effect of the struggle
within the region to modernize its political and social structures, economies,
and Islamic practices. Economic progress has lagged behind population growth
for nearly a quarter of a century, threatening to turn oil wealth into oil poverty
and sharply lowering living standards in many states. Governments have talked
but not practiced economic reform, and they have failed to modernize and open
their political systems.
A massive “youth bulge” (that is, in the demographic age-distribution curve)
is only beginning to create critical unemployment problems; the percentage of
young men and women in the labor force will increase for at least two decades,
because of population momentum. At the same time, hyperurbanization and
population mobility are destroying traditional social safety nets, while modern
media publicize the region’s weakness and at the same time present images of
material wealth that most citizens can never obtain. The result is to drive many
into the mosques, and some toward an Islamic extremism that is at least as
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opposed to modernization and secular government as it is anti-Western. Let us
consider two (albeit extreme) futures.
The Best Case. Most regimes and most pro-reform, pro-modernization elites in
the region finally face the fact they are dealing with an enduring crisis that only
they can solve. Economic reform plans are actually implemented. The need for
population control is recognized and acted upon. Educational systems are mod-
ernized to create job skills. Moderate Islamic scholars meet the challenge from
Islamic extremists. Political systems are liberalized enough to create a rule of law,
stable structures for economic development, and broader participation. It is a
close race between reform and regression, and the race is lost in several coun-
tries; in broad terms, however, the progressive forces win.
The Worst Case. Regional elites continue to talk but not act and to export the
blame and responsibility for their problems. A systemic mix of economic and
population problems creates massive internal instability. The West gets much of
the blame; nonetheless, effective political leadership, economic action, and
modernization in the region become impossible. Moderate Islamic leaders con-
tinue to temporize and avoid coming to grips with extremists. Events play out
differently in each state, but the cumulative result is structural economic col-
lapse and political turmoil, with no near-term prospect of progress.
The Impact of the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Second Intifada
The struggle between Israel and the Palestinians and the broader struggle be-
tween Israel and its Arab neighbors is only one factor fueling regional extrem-
ism, resentment of the United States and the West, and terrorism. It is, however,
a critical one. Even if Arab leaders sometimes use it as a scapegoat or distraction
for their own failings, it remains a real human tragedy for Israeli and Arab alike.
What might the future hold? Again, two extremes can be imagined.
The Best Case. An early return to serious peace talks and to the terms of the Jan-
uary 2001 negotiations at Tabah and Camp David seems impossible. The second
Intifada may well drag on for several years in some form, escalating sporadically.
Sheer exhaustion and frustration, however, eventually force changes in political
leadership in both Israel and the Palestinian Authority and lead Syria to face the
need for real-world compromises. Israel, the Palestinians, and Syria edge back
toward negotiations. They finally reach a series of compromises that are unpop-
ular on all sides but with which all sides can live. Peace, however, is still based on
anger, distrust, and sometimes hate. Violence without outright war is replaced
by peace with some level of violence.
The Worst Case. Three failed leaders—Ariel Sharon, Yasser Arafat, and Bashar
al-Assad—slowly drag their countries into a steadily escalating conflict. Israel
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produces a policy of forced separation, pushing Palestinians out of some areas
and leaving them without an economy and only the shell of a state. The Palestin-
ians acquire longer-range weapons. Jordan is destabilized and becomes
anti-Western, anti-peace, and pro-Iraq. Egypt distances itself from peace and
from the United States. Nuclear and biological saber rattling becomes constant.
Syria and Iran expand their support of extremists and their use of proxies in a
low-intensity war. The United States and the West get much of the blame, and
terrorism becomes a fact of life.
Saudi Arabia and the Southern Gulf States
Events since 11 September have created major new tensions between the West
and the Persian Gulf states, particularly between the United States and Saudi
Arabia. They have also exposed the urgency with which Saudi Arabia must take
action to diversify and privatize its economy, deal with its massive population
problems and youth bulge, modernize its education system and implement
Saudisation, come firmly to grips with the need for religious modernization,
and cope with Islamic extremism. What are two, quite different possibilities?
The Best Case. The United States and Saudi Arabia realize that military disen-
gagement and political feuding are no substitutes for a more effective partner-
ship. Crown Prince Abdullah and President G. W. Bush concentrate on creating
a new strategic partnership. Saudi Arabia aggressively implements its plans and
efforts in the area of economic reform, diversification, and privatization. The
educational system is reformed, and the regime takes seriously the need to op-
pose Islamic extremism and terrorism while maintaining its religious legitimacy
with the moderate Ulema. Political reform keeps pace with the evolution of
Saudi society.
TheWorst Case.U.S.-Saudi relations so deteriorate that the United States largely
disengages in military terms, creating a power vacuum in the Gulf, leaving Saudi
Arabia without effective military advisers or technical support, and making ef-
fective cooperation in counterterrorism impossible. Saudi efforts at economic,
population, educational, religious, and political reform falter, leading to grow-
ing internal instability. The Saudi regime falls, and progressive technocrats and
businessmen flee. The result is a weak, extremist Saudi Arabia that cannot
achieve the level of investment necessary to expand oil exports to meet world
demand.
The Impact of Iran
Iran is not “evil”; it is deeply divided between religious hard-liners and more
moderate elements. It is a major proliferator of weapons, however, and it has sig-
nificant capabilities to threaten or attack the flow of oil through the Gulf. It is
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committed to supporting anti-Israeli movements. At the same time, Iran’s inter-
nal economic problems undermine its stability as an oil exporter and its ability
to attract the outside investment and technology it needs to maintain and ex-
pand energy exports. How might Iran develop?
The Best Case. The moderate factions in Iran slowly win their long political bat-
tle with the hard-liners and extremists. Iran carries out serious economic reform
and restructures its energy sector to attract large-scale foreign investment.
Weapons proliferation is cut back, and no major CBRN forces are deployed. Iran
seeks regional stability and peaceful political influence. Its opposition to Israel is
reduced to political hostility; it accepts an eventual peace settlement between Is-
rael and its Arab neighbors.
TheWorst Case. Moderation and democracy (in any significant degree) fail, be-
cause the hard-liners successfully block reform, assert their power over the in-
ternal security apparatus, and drag Iran into conflicts with the West, Israel, and
Iran’s neighbors, out of conviction and as a means of mobilizing the state. Iran
supports terrorism and expands its arms shipments to Palestinian and Lebanese
extremists. It openly proliferates weapons and uses its missiles and CBRN capa-
bilities to threaten its Gulf neighbors, Israel, and U.S. forces in the region. It ex-
pands its maritime and air threat to Gulf shipping as a further means of
politico-military leverage.
The Impact of Iraq
More than a decade since the Gulf War left Saddam Hussein’s regime in power
and a still-powerful conventional military machine in being, Iraq presumably
has a considerable capability to develop weapons of mass destruction. Iraq also
is a continuing threat to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Iraq plays a growing
role in supporting Palestinian hard-liners. At the same time, renewed oil wealth
and oil-for-food arrangements have not begun to correct the effects of some
twenty years of crisis, war, and failure to develop, nor is there the stable climate
necessary to develop energy resources. Should we be optimistic or pessimistic?
The Best Case. Iraq’s regime proves to be far more fragile than expected; internal
tensions destroy not only Saddam Hussein but also the elite around him. Leaders
emerge who focus on the peaceful development of Iraq and can force sufficient
unity of action upon Sunni, Shi’ite, and Kurd. Economic reform takes place; re-
sources go into social development and not arms; and Iraq becomes a major but
peaceful player in regional and Arab politics.
The Worst Case. Saddam Hussein’s tyranny continues and becomes hereditary
as his younger son institutionalizes his power. Efforts to support an uprising
around a weak opposition fail and strengthen Saddam by default. This “Bay of
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Kurdistan” failure deprives the United States of the regional allies it needs for a
major war to remove Saddam from power. Saddam breaks out of UN sanctions,
rearms, and reproliferates. He is a constant source of tension throughout the
Middle East and supports terrorism by proxy, hardening Iranian attitudes and
posing an unremitting threat to the region and its energy exports.
Another “Algerian Civil War” in North Africa?
Algeria has “won” its civil war against its Islamic extremists, but all North Afri-
can states have failed at effective economic reform and face major demographic
crises. Islamic extremism is gaining influence in the Maghreb for the same rea-
sons it is gaining influence in other parts of the Middle East. What might happen
in North Africa?
The Best Case.North African states finally act upon their economic and political
reform plans. They aggressively deal with the problem of population growth.
They encourage serious privatization and foreign investment, and avoid mili-
tary adventures. Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia succeed in internal economic re-
form. Algeria’s vicious and corrupt military junta is overthrown without
shifting power to Islamic extremists.
TheWorst Case. North Africa becomes a shoreline of failed regimes and econo-
mies. A new Algerian-style civil war breaks out in several of these states, and ex-
tremists seize power. Energy investment is inadequate, and political and
economic instability encourage massive new flows of emigration, attacks on en-
ergy facilities, and the export of terrorism. Europe is directly affected by all three
consequences.
Extremism and Terrorism
Global terrorism does not originate solely in the Middle East; it is a serious prob-
lem in many countries and among many movements. What is its trajectory?
The Best Case. Regional regimes realize that they cannot tolerate extremism or
the export of terrorism without being counterattacked, without making more
likely their own eventual overthrow, and without further crippling their pros-
pects for social and economic development. In the short run, they deal effec-
tively with internal security issues. In the long run, they make the economic,
social, political, and religious reforms necessary to deal with the root causes of
terrorism.
TheWorst Case. Leaders temporize, dither, and exploit extremism and terrorism
for short-term advantage. Terrorists are used in both regional and global proxy
wars and attacks. Radical regimes steadily encourage terrorism and provide ter-
rorists better weapons, tolerating or encouraging their acquisition of CBRN
weapons. U.S. and Western counterterrorist attacks and campaigns win tactical
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victories but cannot address the root causes; each success accordingly breeds
more skilled and determined terrorist groups. World order and liberal values are
threatened, exactly as extremists hope, and millions die.
Proliferation and CBRNWeapons
Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Syria, the Sudan, Iran, and Iraq are all proliferators.
al-Qa‘ida has made it clear that terrorists have a serious interest in CBRN weap-
ons as well. Current arms-control and export-control policies cannot deal with
the problem. What might happen?
The Best Case. A total roll-back in CBRN weapons capability is impossible. No
amount of control or inspection can prevent states or even subnational groups
from becoming able to manufacture significant amounts of biological agents
with nuclear-like lethalities and to use them with only limited, if any, alerting to
the targeted state. The resolution of regional quarrels, the advance of political
and economic reform, and some form of inspection and arms control do, how-
ever, reduce proliferation to very low-profile stockpiling, eliminate the specter
of delivery by hair-trigger missile and air forces, and produce true roll-back in
some countries.
TheWorst Case.The race for weapons of mass destruction becomes increasingly
widespread. Saber rattling and CBRN threats become endemic. Nations develop
first-strike capabilities and launch-on-warning/launch-under-attack options.
Terrorists manipulate this volatile situation so as to trigger a major exchange
somewhere in the world, or a radical leader starts a process of escalation that
cannot be stopped. A catastrophe ensues.
Immigration, Labor Mobility, and Prejudice
Europe already sees regional immigration—particularly illegal immigra-
tion—as a major security threat. Economic and demographic pressures can
make this kind of threat much worse in the future. The resulting racial and reli-
gious prejudice can harden Islamic antagonism with the West and encourage
terrorism; similar forces can impel millions from Latin America or Asia toward
wealthy nations like the United States. What might then happen?
The Best Case.Widespread economic and population control reforms attack the
root cause of the problem while Western and regional governments work far
more closely together to limit its near-term impact.
TheWorst Case. Massive waves of attempted and successful illegal immigration
trigger draconian “First World” responses and equally hostile regional reactions
among impoverished societies. A “clash of civilizations” becomes a clash over
immigration throughout the world.
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REDEFINING FORWARD PRESENCE
Several aspects of this list of challenges need to be kept carefully in mind. The
first is that only some of these problems and challenges may have major impact
at any given time. The second is that neither the best nor the worst case normally
takes place; the actual pattern of events almost always lies somewhere between.
The third is that the primary responses must come from within the affected re-
gion; these are not problems that can be fixed from the outside—although this is
not reassuring in a region like the Middle East that has mastered the art of ex-
porting blame while failing to take decisive action. The fourth is that no one can
predict which challenge will emerge at a given time, the exact threat it will pose,
or what other challenges may be ongoing. Finally, while U.S. military power in
regions like the Middle East can help deal with all these problems to a greater or
lesser degree, the primary agents of American action in the political and grand
strategic dimensions will be the president, secretary of state, secretary of de-
fense, and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Creeping Withdrawal versus Positive Engagement
That said, U.S. military forces cannot afford simply to deal with these problems
passively and wait for events to take their course. It is easy to call for low-profile,
reduced forces and to achieve “smaller footprints” by moving forces and facili-
ties offshore and over the horizon. The practical question is whether that ap-
proach really would make the United States any more popular or less
controversial, and whether it would be as effective as a major effort to engage
and explain. There is a real risk that no critic of the United States will notice or
care about reductions in presence and visibility, that there will be steadily esca-
lating demands to eliminate any kind of U.S. presence, and thus that the United
States (and its allies) will only have lost substantial deterrent and defensive capa-
bility by withdrawing.
Instead, U.S. forces could take a number of important actions. In terms of
forward presence, they can greatly strengthen efforts to engage Middle Eastern
military forces and civilians. This inevitably means putting men and women,
aircraft, ships, and facilities into harm’s way. It means expanding diplomatic and
outreach activities, increasing and restructuring training and exercise coopera-
tion and related programs, and making a far more deliberate effort to explain the
value of U.S. presence to the Arab media and civilians. The Navy in particular
has long been a de facto diplomat; all U.S. military services and commands must
now become regional politicians, ready to assist regimes striving for a political
order compatible with American values and to defeat terrorism and other forces
of asymmetric warfare. The United States needs to staff, prioritize, and fund this
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mission as one that may well be more important than purely military tasks like
air strikes and mine warfare.
U.S. forces alone, however, can reach out only in very limited ways beyond
military-to-military relations. If the United States is to explain and justify its
presence, arms sales, security relations, and efforts to build regional coalitions,
the State Department and American embassies in the region must be far more
active and effective than in the past. Volumes could be, and are being, written
about the role and impact of American and multinational corporations in the
globalized economy of the future.
The State Department has a long way to go in its handling of the public diplo-
macy involved in such issues as U.S. policy toward Iraq and the impact of sanc-
tions. It has failed to create a public diplomacy to deal with terrorism and
extremism. Its efforts to explain the threat of proliferation have been both pa-
tronizing and childish. Above all, it has accepted the concept that regional gov-
ernments can maintain virtual silence about their military relations with the
United States, relying on sheer authority rather than explaining and justifying
these relations to their people. This simply is not an acceptable approach in an
era of broad social and economic unrest, Islamic extremism, and backlash from
the Arab-Israeli issue and the impact of sanctions on the Iraqi people. It is sim-
ply not acceptable in an era of satellite television, Internet newsletters, and inces-
sant questions, criticisms, and attacks.
Shifts in Military Posture and Activity
U.S. military forces inside and outside the Middle East have a number of useful
options. One is to reexamine comprehensively their advisory, arms sales, and
foreign training programs, including such relatively low-cost programs as Inter-
national Military Education and Training. This can be coupled to a second op-
tion—finding ways to make friendly militaries even closer partners, giving them
as many meaningful mission and exercise tasks as possible, and stressing
low-cost and low-technology forms of interoperability.
Another is to clear up the corruption created even in the official Foreign Mili-
tary Sales program by systematic abuse of so-called offset arrangements (indus-
trial compensation to the buying country, typically in technology transfer or
commodities), as well as the corruption involved in hiring consultants, ship-
ping, and purchasing in non-FMS contracts. U.S. arms sales under FMS have far
more integrity and effectiveness than those of most other countries, but every
one of these U.S. arrangements must be spotless. Furthermore, public diplo-
macy must explain and justify such contracts in ways that are convincing to peo-
ple in the region, show that they are honest, that they really contribute to
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effective national defense, and that the United States is serious about coalitions
and interoperability.
In any case, the era of “burden sharing” through arms sales is over. It is part of
the problem and not part of the solution. The challenge now is to create true
partnerships, based on respect and with no vestigial elements of patronizing
mentorship. Wherever possible, “joint” should mean “coalition.” Exercises, op-
erations, and other activities should be tailored to support and validate an en-
gagement strategy.
At the same time, however, U.S. forces need to look toward the future. Pres-
ence should not be forced on reluctant friends and allies, and it should be made
clear to friends and foes alike that the United States is strengthening both its
over-the-horizon options and its ability to shift forces rapidly and yet operate ef-
fectively. In this regard, the Navy needs to engineer future ships for greater en-
durance and less dependence on local facilities and support. Naval and Marine
aviation need to take very careful looks indeed at their decades-long tendency to
emphasize aspects of aircraft performance other than range. All four services
need to examine the range, payload, and endurance of all future fixed and rotary-
wing aircraft to emphasize ability to operate at long ranges. Some of their efforts
to rush into reliance on short- or medium-range unmanned aerial vehicles and
combat vehicles (UAVs and UCAVs) need to be reviewed.
The United States should examine options for using ships as replacements for
land facilities in forward areas, and for ways to link the Army’s and Marine
Corps’ searches for future generations of lighter and more mobile weapons with
new, more cost-effective approaches to sea-based prepositioning. It needs to tai-
lor all aspects of its air- and sea-based firepower and associated intelligence, tar-
geting, and battle-damage assessment systems so as to reduce both collateral
damage and the destructiveness of attacks—lessening the impact of actual com-
bat upon a region.
This approach has implications for several elements of naval forces, such as
“arsenal ships” and long-range cruise missiles. The Navy badly needs low-cost
cruise missiles, possibly more than it needs more sophisticated ones. Finding ad-
vanced and relatively low-profile ways to deal with mines and coastal subma-
rines may warrant even higher priority. Also, the value of long-range air and
theater missile defenses deployed exclusively on ships at sea will grow as political
pressures mount to reduce American presence on allied soil. Retailoring mari-
time surveillance and intelligence capability to make more use of low-profile
assets like long-endurance UAVs may have similar value.
It should be stressed again, however, that retreat over the horizon or to more
remote regional bases is not a desirable option; to some extent it is a strategic
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defeat. It may well prove far more expensive than engagement and partnership,
be less effective, and ultimately do little to make the United States more popular.
REDEFINING LOW-INTENSITY COMBAT
U.S. military forces cannot afford to focus on force transformation, terrorism,
and asymmetric warfare to the point of weakening capabilities to engage in a
major regional conflict against Iraq or be able to deal quickly and decisively with
any threat from Iran. They cannot deal with a political and strategic mosaic as
complicated as the Middle East as if one approach to terrorism and asymmetric
warfare applies to the entire region; as if the attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon somehow give the United States unrestricted freedom of ac-
tion; as if the “9/11” mentality justifies ignoring the views of friends and allies or
the complications and risks that result from even the most successful U.S. mili-
tary action.
The Lessons and Nonlessons of Afghanistan
As the previous complex list of challenges has shown, the United States must
take account of not only potential threats but the broad forces shaping instabil-
ity in the Middle East, the views of its allies, and the need to forge coalitions. It
needs to tailor its approach to deterrence and defense so as to deal with each in-
dividual country, each organization, and each major terrorist actor. This in turn
means that U.S. military forces must be flexible and adaptive. One of the key
lessons of past wars is that military doctrine should be abandoned on the first
day of conflict—that strategy, tactics, and war plans should immediately give
way to reality. This is all the more so in the case of asymmetric warfare and
counterterrorism, where rigidity and routine are synonyms for vulnerability.
As we are learning to our cost, even major military successes in Afghanistan
may not bring us victory in any traditional sense of the term. In fact, it is not
clear that a thoroughgoing defeat of al-Qa‘ida is tantamount to victory. The
classic case of Aleksandr Ulyanov is a warning of what may come. In 1887 the
czar’s secret police found and killed the young revolutionary and destroyed the
organization of which he was a part. By doing so, however, it produced a far
more serious future threat, by changing the life goals of his younger brother—
known to history as Vladimir Ilich Lenin.1
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approved planning guidance after the
collapse of the Taliban stating that the war could easily last to 2008 and beyond.2
U.S. military planners and counterterrorism experts are also warning that the
struggle in Afghanistan provides lessons for enemies as well as for friendly
forces. They speculate that future terrorist and asymmetric opponents will strive
to create far looser and more broadly distributed networks, groups of cells that
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have a high degree of individual independence and survivability and that do not
have rigid hierarchies, headquarters, or physical facilities that can be located and
attacked. They argue that a key lesson of Afghanistan to such enemies is the need
for more anonymity, more emphasis on cover organizations and proxies, and for
sequential or multiple attacks from isolated cells and elements so that losses in
any one area will not halt the overall campaign.
What remains to be seen is whether such lessons will be applied only in future
wars or whether they will affect this one. Many elements of al-Qa‘ida were not in
Afghanistan, and large numbers of its fighters and leaders seem to have escaped.
It is at least possible that they will reorganize and mount new terrorist attacks.
Alternatively, elements of al-Qa‘ida may go underground, reconstitute them-
selves, and emerge with new names, new leaders, and new methods of attack. It
has become a cliché to say that death cannot deter a suicide bomber. It may be
equally true that negating one kind of threat of terrorists or other asymmetric
opponents simply forces them to devise and implement another kind.
Other disturbing aspects of the partial victory that has been won to date need
to be kept in mind in interpreting the lessons of the Afghan war and the chal-
lenges it poses for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. One of these is that it re-
mains impossible to prove a negative—such as that Iraq played no role in
supporting the terrorist attacks. The same was true earlier of Syria’s role in the
Marine Corps barracks bombing in Beirut and of Iran’s role in the bombings in
al-Khobar. Nothing about Afghanistan indicates that the United States has
found a solution to state use of terrorists as proxies in asymmetric warfare.
This, in turn, raises the possibility that terrorist movements will deliberately
attempt to implicate states falsely in their attacks, either to drag them into the
conflict as allies or to make them erroneous targets. States may do the same with
other states. One has only to consider what would have happened if al-Qa‘ida
had deliberately tried to implicate Iraq, or if Iran had done so. False proxies,
black and false flags, and Trojan horses may be just as much a part of future
asymmetric and terrorist conflict as real opponents.
The Limitations of the Afghan Conflict, and Lessons for the Iraq Option. All of
these factors add up to a warning about the differences between defeating an ex-
tremely weak opponent like the Taliban and fighting an opponent like Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq. There is no doubt that the Iraqi regime has its vulnerabilities.
Nonetheless, it is a far better organized, stronger, and in some ways a more pop-
ular tyranny than was the Taliban. It is also a power capable of serious war fight-
ing, with 2,200 tanks, other heavy forces, nearly four hundred aircraft, and
weapons of mass destruction. If one considers the unique conditions of the
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Afghan conflict, it should be clear that Afghanistan is not Iraq and that the mili-
tary lessons of Afghanistan may at best have only limited applicability elsewhere.
At the same time, Afghanistan provides a warning of the dangers of putting
too much emphasis on numerical force strength, military history, and the out-
come of military analysis, while ignoring how “intangibles” can suddenly and
unexpectedly change the outcome of wars. Military strength and the past perfor-
mance of local forces proved to be poor predictors of actual war-fighting capa-
bility and endurance. The catalytic collapse of the Taliban and al-Qa‘ida was
indeed possible, but it was not probable; the United States and Britain had con-
siderable luck with several key intangibles. Likewise, in Kosovo in 1999 one
could do no more than guess how long Serbian forces would resist Nato’s air
campaign, or how the Serbs would react politically, given the military targets de-
stroyed, industrial and infrastructure facilities damaged, and Kosovar refugees
who had fled. Iraq’s performance in the final battles of the Iran-Iraq War was far
more impressive than its performance during the Gulf War, and in 1990 there
had been no way to be sure Iraqi forces would sit passively in Kuwait while coali-
tion forces acquired decisive defensive strength and then dominant offensive
capability.
While the U.S. military experience in Afghanistan may not translate directly
into war-fighting experience in Iraq or any other case, factors like political and
military leadership, morale, adaptability, and other intangibles could again lead
to a far more rapid Iraqi collapse than the numbers would indicate. They could
just as well produce the opposite effect in terms of Iraqi nationalism, resolve,
and hostility. The uncertainties in such intangibles can swing either way. For all
the success in the past months, it is important to note that the United States and
Britain have not won a war; they have won a major victory in a single theater.
The two key leaders of the opposition—Sheik Omar of the Taliban and Usama
Bin Laden of al-Qa‘ida—remain (at this writing) unaccounted for. This is not
complete victory in a war fought at least as much for political symbols as to de-
feat military and paramilitary enemies.
Civilian Cover, Collateral Damage, and Human Rights as Weapons of War
The enemy use of civilian cover and the possibilities for manipulation of civilian
casualties and collateral damage may be an equally important lesson. The Gulf
War, the fight against Iraq since that time, Kosovo, and the Afghan war all saw ef-
forts to use civilians and civilian facilities as shields against U.S. and allied at-
tacks. Distributed terrorist networks and state-sponsored asymmetric forces can
be expected to make more use of civilians as shields and of civilian areas as hid-
ing places. Extremist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas have long gone farther,
as have Kurdish terrorist organizations in Turkey. They deliberately blur the lines
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between terrorist and combat elements; religious elements and functions; edu-
cational, humanitarian, and medical elements and functions; and “peaceful” po-
litical elements and belligerent actions.
In the process, terrorist organizations like al-Qa‘ida and states like Iraq have
found that well-organized political and media campaigns can make responsibil-
ity for terrorist and military acts unclear; conversely, they can use collateral
damage and human suffering as political weapons. Wrapping movements in the
cloak of democratic values, exaggerating civilian casualties and suffering, and
exploiting human rights and international law are becoming parts of an ever
more sophisticated mode of modern terrorism and asymmetric warfare.
So, for that matter, are religion and ethnicity and the willingness to exploit
the causes and sufferings of others. al-Qa‘ida and Saddam Hussein, for example,
have systematically exploited Islam, their identity as Arabs, and the second Inti-
fada. Slobodan Milosevic and his elite did something very similar in Bosnia and
Kosovo, exploiting Christianity and Slavic identity with Russia. The Taliban
misrepresented the Afghan situation by producing grossly exaggerated claims of
civilian casualties. While an independent estimate by the Associated Press put
the figure at some five or six hundred, the Taliban ambassador alleged that fif-
teen hundred civilians had been killed, the Arab press service Al-Jazeera gave es-
timates as high as six thousand, and one economist at the University of New
Hampshire produced estimates of five thousand (and then 3,100–3,800). In
some cases the Taliban is known to have reported civilian casualties when there
were no such casualties at all.3
The United States faces a broad challenge in dealing with such issues in part
because, as the fighting in Afghanistan has shown, pilots and unmanned aerial
vehicles cannot always distinguish enemy forces and facilities from civilians in
asymmetric wars, either in built-up areas or in the open. The same seems to be
true even of special warfare teams on the ground. Independent teams, working
with local allies, cannot get the full background on suspicious movements and
behavior patterns; they often are fed misinformation or deliberate lies. The
Afghan war demonstrated that such groups can sometimes get much better in-
formation on unconventional combatants than any sensor or airborne platform,
but not even “fusion” of their reports with data from combat aircraft, satellites,
UAVs, signals-intelligence aircraft, and other human intelligence can fully char-
acterize many targets or reliably distinguish combatants from civilians.4
Further, the United States has no clear methodology for detecting collateral
damage or estimating its scale. While certainly seeking to minimize collateral
damage in broad terms, like other military powers the United States does not an-
nounce estimates of either loss of life or the indirect costs, particularly cultural
and economic, of military strikes. Since Vietnam it has avoided public “body
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counts” of troops or civilians killed. This reluctance allowed Iraq, Serbia, and the
Taliban some propaganda successes with grossly inflated claims of civilian casu-
alties and collateral damage. While many human rights groups have been careful
to examine such claims, others have swallowed them whole, and hostile coun-
tries and political factions have done the same.
The United States was able largely to avoid the political backlash from ci-
vilian casualties and collateral damage during the Gulf War, although exag-
gerated casualty claims—particularly on the “highway of death” during the
final Iraqi escape from Kuwait City—contributed to the early termination of
the coalition advance and the declaration of a cease-fire. Washington has
been less successful since that time in countering Iraqi claims on a strike-by-
strike basis.
In 1999, both the United States and Nato had to address civilian casualties
and collateral damage in Kosovo on a daily basis, and spokesmen often made
mistaken claims or had to admit inability to confirm or deny Serbian charges.
This often gave Serbia a propaganda advantage during the fighting. After the
campaign, the Department of Defense largely dodged the domestic political fall-
out by issuing its after-action report to Congress only after the issue had lost ma-
jor media impact, and by defining collateral damage so narrowly as to exclude
many incidents.5 Nevertheless, the problem is real, and there is little reason to
suspect that it will not be even more serious whenever the United States must
deal with more formidable threats or more intense asymmetric wars.
Designing Weapons to Deal with Collateral Damage
The other side of this coin is that properly designed weapons and systems for re-
connaissance and targeting can now greatly reduce the problem of collateral
damage and civilian casualties. The global reaction to the fighting in Afghani-
stan shows that the United States does not always have to yield to the kind of ex-
treme media and human rights criticism that attempts to preclude all use of
military force by making any civilian or friendly fire casualties or collateral dam-
age unacceptable. If the world accepts the need for military action, it also accepts
the inevitability of such losses. The United States does, however, have to demon-
strate that it has made a good-faith effort to minimize collateral damage and ci-
vilian casualties. Ever since Vietnam, each improvement in military capability has
been matched by demands for higher standards of performance in that respect. The
U.S. effort to develop smaller precision-guided weapons, like 250-pound versions
of the JDAM,* is one example. Another is the series of major improvements in
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target selection and review made after the inadvertent strike on the Chinese em-
bassy in Belgrade.
There remain, however, a number of areas where the United States can do
more. The British, for instance, are experimenting with devices that inactivate
the warhead when systems malfunction or lose their targeting lock. The U.S.
military needs to come to grips with the long-standing problem of cluster muni-
tions and “dumb” bombs that effectively turn into land mines if they do not ex-
plode on impact. Improved release systems, navigation and targeting aids, and
wind correction can help up to a point; but the 1,150 cluster bombs that U.S. air-
craft dropped on 188 locations in Afghanistan as of early February had many of
the same defects as the weapons dropped in Vietnam and the Gulf War, which
often produced duds that could be lethal if handled.6 This is not a problem that
should take three decades to solve.
More generally, the United States needs to examine ways in which it can de-
sign sensor, intelligence, and targeting systems specifically to minimize collat-
eral damage and civilian casualties and to provide some form of near-real-time
warning or imagery to allow rapid confirmation of whether or not mistakes have
occurred. This does not mean paralyzing operations; it does mean changing de-
sign criteria and methods to allow operations to be sustained with minimal cost
to the innocent and with minimal political backlash.
A longer-run need is for some mix of methods and technology that can pro-
duce meaningful “body counts,” at least over time. Vietnam—with its endless
phony casualties and pressure to take risks in attacking civilian targets—is
scarcely an example to follow. But as we have seen, if the United States does not
produce reasonable and well-founded estimates of its own, others will produce
unreasonable and politicized ones. Beyond that, minimizing casualties requires
an understanding of what “casualties” really are. Physical collateral damage can
always be fixed, or structures replaced. People cannot.
POWER PROJECTION AND FORCE TRANSFORMATION
The Afghan war has again demonstrated the necessity to be able to project land
and air power rapidly over very long distances. It has demonstrated the value of
strategic airlift, long-range strike, and the ability to operate with limited forward
bases. At the same time, it has confirmed the value of light forces like special
warfare units for counterterrorism and some forms of asymmetric warfare. Ma-
jor regional contingencies and wars involving armor and heavily defended air-
space constitute only one point along a changing spectrum of conflict.
It is unwise to generalize without detailed data on the forces engaged in a
given conflict and on the course of battles and engagements. It is dangerous, as
we have seen, to generalize at all from the Afghan conflict, given its unique
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character. Nevertheless, certain insights about force transformation and power
projection do seem clear.
The Changing Nature of Joint Warfare and Combined-Arms Mix
Virtually every major recent war has shown the growing value of joint opera-
tions and of the integration of land-air-sea operations in ways adapted to the
needs of a given conflict. Like Kosovo, however, the Afghan conflict has shown
that a combination of precision air and missile strike capability, coupled with
greatly improved intelligence and targeting systems, can sometimes supply
much of the heavy firepower that previously had to be provided by artillery and
armor.
The shift toward precision weaponry continues. Some 6,700 of the twelve
thousand air weapons the United States dropped in Afghanistan by 7 December
2001—56 percent of all weapons dropped—were precision guided. By early Feb-
ruary 2002, roughly ten thousand weapons out of a total of eighteen thousand
dropped were precision munitions—still 56 percent. This compares with 35 per-
cent of the twenty-four thousand weapons dropped during the Kosovo campaign
in 1999.7 Also, a new ability to correct for dispersal by wind, as well as greatly im-
proved navigation and targeting capabilities, made the delivery of unguided
weapons far more precise than it had been.
Granted, in both Afghanistan and Kosovo the U.S. and allied forces enjoyed
nearly complete air supremacy and thus were able to engage enemy ground
forces in ways that allowed those forces to make only limited, if any, use of their
armor or artillery—aside from battles against local American allies and proxies.
Nevertheless, the nature of the air-land battle seems today to have evolved sig-
nificantly even in comparison to as recent a conflict as Kosovo.8
Still, U.S. and British forces in Afghanistan would have had the time, had the
opponent possessed more serious military capabilities, to win air superiority
and suppress air defenses. They could have committed more attack helicopters
and gunships to the battle, and possibly lighter and more mobile artillery and ar-
mor. (Granted, this would have presented equipment, lift, and mobility prob-
lems for both the Army and Marine Corps. The Army lacks sufficient light
armored and all-terrain vehicles for its special forces, and Marine Corps light
mechanized forces are still too tied to amphibious missions as opposed to pro-
jection by airlift.)
The United States and Britain could also have added more highly trained spe-
cial warfare elements, forward air controllers, and experts in the local lan-
guages and culture. Such personnel obviously cannot in many contingencies
substitute for heavy ground forces; it is important to note that the Afghan war per
se is not an argument for lighter tanks and artillery, nor for lighter and more
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“projectable” mechanized ground forces. This heavy-lift quandary complicates
the restructuring of the Marine Corps for operations in the Middle East, and
possibly also the relative roles of the Marine Corps and the Army.
Closing the “Sensor to Shooter Loop” in Near Real Time
Recent wars have also demonstrated the value of coalition warfare in every as-
pect of operations, from power projection to combat. The Afghan conflict, how-
ever, is particularly interesting because light allied forces like the British Special
Air Service are proving highly effective without expensive high-technology
equipment, standardization, or interoperability. Similarly, relatively primitive
local ground forces have substituted effectively for American ground forces
when supported by U.S. special forces and advisers, and by air and missile
strikes. The Kosovar Liberation Army and other Kosovar forces played quite dif-
ferent roles in 1999.
Once again, there are clear limits to the applicability of this lesson. How-
ever, the American and British experience in Afghanistan may indicate that
the United States and Nato have overstressed the high-technology and high-
investment aspects of coalition warfare and interoperability and have paid too
little attention to highly trained, lighter forces like the SAS and its Australian,
Canadian, German, and other equivalents. Even small numbers of highly
trained advisers, forward air controllers, and targeteers on the ground, supple-
mented by rapid transfers of low and medium-technology arms, may usefully
strengthen local forces. It seems fair to say that the United States has been more
prone to seek high-technology partners or to go it alone than to use its special-
ized strengths in ways that help it operate with less-well-equipped Western and
regional allies. This may have been too narrow an approach, if not the wrong
one, to coalition warfare and interoperability in many mission areas.
That said, no one can dismiss the major impact that new technologies—in
the areas of improved intelligence, targeting, precision strike, assessment and re-
strike capabilities—have had in Afghanistan, particularly because they were em-
ployed with new tactics and as part of new systems.9 According to General
Tommy Franks, commander of U.S. Central Command forces, the United States
flew an average of two hundred sorties a day in Afghanistan by early February
2002, versus three thousand a day in DESERT STORM. It was, however, able to hit
roughly the same number of targets per day as in DESERT STORM.10 General
Franks stated that whereas the United States needed an average of ten aircraft to
take out a target in DESERT STORM, a single aircraft could often take out two tar-
gets in Afghanistan. It also was much more able to bring large numbers of preci-
sion weapons rapidly to bear against a wide array of targets. In one case, U.S.
forces fired roughly a hundred JDAMs in a twenty-minute period.11
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All this was made possible by added reliance on precision-guided weapons
and by many advances in tactics and technology. U.S. forces could draw on
greatly enhanced real-time satellite, U-2, JSTARS, RIVET JOINT,* and UAV data
on the movements of enemy and friendly forces. It became possible to target en-
emy forces with high precision in real time, even as they were engaged by Afghan
ground forces; to communicate this targeting data to U.S. bombers and strike
fighters; to conduct precision strikes with both precision-guided weapons and
area ordnance; and then at least partially to assess damage and, as necessary,
retarget and restrike almost immediately. The United States was able to “close
the loop,” conducting air and missile strikes in near real time. It was an impres-
sive advance in techniques that had their origins in the spotter aircraft and “kill
boxes” of the Gulf War and that had been significantly developed in Kosovo. At
least some of the data links used to provide real-time retargeting data to aircraft
were still relatively crude and had poor human-interface design features; also,
avionics and air munitions were not fully optimized to use such data. It is also
clear, nonetheless, that the level of U.S. success in the Afghan conflict suggests
the advantages that can be realized by “closing the loop” in the future.
Unmanned aerial vehicles have been the focus of most of the attention paid to
technology during the Afghan conflict, but initially the United States possessed
few of the key types of UAVs involved, and many of the “twenty-four hours a
day/seven days a week” improvements planned in imagery and electronic intelli-
gence satellites were not yet deployed. The Predator UAV, for example, remains a
deeply troubled system. It largely failed operational testing before the Afghan
war, with some eight crashes in the six months before the conflict. It cannot take
off in severe rain, snow, ice, or fog; its imagery lacks the resolution needed to find
and characterize some types of targets; it is a slow flier (ninety miles per hour)
and operates best at ten thousand feet, which puts it within range of many forms
of light antiaircraft weapons, leading to losses in Afghanistan and Iraq; it has
awkward control systems and ergonomics; and each unit (four planes and a
ground station) costs about twenty-five million dollars.12
Little detail is available on the current strengths and weakness of the AWACS,†
JSTARS, U-2, RIVET JOINT, P-3, satellite, and other sensor platforms that ulti-
mately did most of the work. It is clear from the fiscal year (FY) 2003 defense
budget submission, however, that funds are being provided to improve virtually
every system and that serious attention is being given to new sensors for aircraft
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like tankers and for more sophisticated sensors to other aircraft. The idea of
combining the functions of AWACS and JSTARS in a single platform is also be-
ing explored.
The number of special warfare teams deployed in Afghanistan to provide
on-the-ground intelligence and targeting designation was very small, probably
only a fraction of the number that will be found useful in the future.13 Many of
the data links, targeting systems, and communications systems provided to spe-
cial forces and rear-area intelligence and targeting analysts lacked the desired
range and reliability and can still be greatly improved.14 Other needed improve-
ments include lighter and longer-range laser designators, and light all-terrain
vehicles that are more mobile and less detectable than systems like the
“Humvee.”15
Furthermore, virtually all of the assets involved can be improved in ways that
enhance the tactical impact of strikes, increase their lethality, and reduce the
risks of friendly fire and collateral damage.
Targeting, Intelligence, and Battle-Damage Assessment
Technology, however, is only part of the challenge. During the Gulf War, in the
December 1998 air and cruise-missiles strikes against Iraqi weapons-of-mass-
destruction facilities, and again in Afghanistan, the United States faced several
major problems in using its strike power effectively, problems that will not be
solved with better sensors and C4I* systems. These difficulties have already been
touched upon—targeting terrorist and asymmetric forces, and estimating col-
lateral damage and civilian casualties.
Such problems are virtually certain to be just as serious in other types of con-
flict. Most Middle Eastern wars will not be “mud hut”conflicts; the United States
may well face fairly large-scale conventional contingencies in which powers like
Iraq choose to fight inside cities and urban areas rather than in the open desert.
It may also have to strike at CBRN facilities and forces dispersed in populated ar-
eas. Furthermore, it may find that attempts by factions to manipulate or mislead
the United States in its strike operations can be just as much of a problem in na-
tions like Iraq as in Afghanistan.
The U.S. ability to locate some kinds of targets is far better than its ability to
characterize them, judge their importance, or assess the level of damage done to
their functional capabilities once they have been struck. The United States did not
demonstrate during the Gulf War, in subsequent attacks on Iraq, or in Afghani-
stan that it had a valid doctrine for striking at leadership, infrastructure, civilian
command and control or intelligence facilities, lines of communications, or other
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strategic rear-area targets. It essentially guessed at their importance and “bombed
for effect.”
As General Franks testified, while the United States needed an average of ten
aircraft to take out a target in DESERT STORM, a single aircraft could often take
out two targets in Afghanistan.16 It seems virtually certain that these figures will
ultimately prove as unconnected to reality as the initial battle-damage claims
made in the Gulf War, later strikes on Iraq, and Kosovo.
The ability of the U.S. military services and intelligence community to per-
form effective battle damage assessment remains a weak link even for conven-
tional military targets like armor, major weapons, depots, and infantry—let
alone in dealing with proliferation of weapons by Iran, Iraq, and Syria. To be
blunt, they simply do not have a credible battle-damage assessment capability.
They have, rather, an ever-changing set of rules that transform vague and inade-
quate damage indicators into detailed estimates by category and type. These
rules and methods have only the crudest analytic controls and cannot survive
even such simple review methods as blind testing. They rely heavily on imagery
that can assess physical damage to buildings and shelters on the surface but can-
not look inside them; such imagery is essentially worthless in estimating person-
nel casualties. Analysts often cannot tell whether a target was already inactive
when struck or had previously been damaged by other kinds of fire. In general,
the American ability to assess functional damage to complex systems like
land-based air defense systems and the resulting degree of degradation in their
operational capabilities is weak. The United States had major problems in these
areas in the Gulf War, Kosovo, and in ten years of strikes against the Iraqi air de-
fense system. It had, and still has, major problems in locating key targets such as
national leaders and the facilities and forces related to weapons of mass
destruction.
The U.S. ability to characterize damage to (and strike) sheltered, hardened,
and close-in targets also remains modest. This constitutes a major problem in
the case of nations that make extensive use of such facilities, like Iraq and Iran,
but it is important to note that U.S. sensors and teams on the ground never suc-
ceeded even in characterizing many much simpler Taliban and al-Qa‘ida facili-
ties, like caves. For example, the Navy SEAL team that explored the cave complex
at Zhawar Kili in February 2002 did not anticipate that it would turn out to be
the largest complex yet uncovered; it had to go inside to determine that the air
strikes had had little or no effect and had left large stocks of supplies intact.17
In short, Afghanistan is yet another warning that “closing the loop” and many
other potential advantages of the “revolution in military affairs” require far
better strategic-assessment and intelligence capabilities for determining the na-
ture and importance of targets, better ways to assess their strategic value and the
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impact of striking them, and an honest admission by the U.S. military and intel-
ligence community that their battle-damage assessment methods are crude and
inadequate, if not intellectually dishonest.
Intelligence, Indications, and Warning. Afghanistan again showed the need to
maintain a large cadre of experts in languages and area affairs in order to con-
duct coalition warfare, support ground and air operations, and deal with the com-
plexities of targeting and battle-damage assessment. In the spring of 2001 the
United States concentrated on China; after 11 September it was suddenly con-
cerned with Afghanistan and some sixty-seven other countries. Clearly, devel-
oping a suitable pool of field capabilities and analysis capabilities cannot be
based solely on prior predictions about threats and scenarios.
Human intelligence is one aspect of such capabilities, but its importance and
value have often been exaggerated. It takes an average of two years to recruit, val-
idate, and train a foreign source. The British found in dealing with Northern Ire-
land that it could take seven years to penetrate tightly organized networks.
Afghanistan is yet another proof that most human sources are unreliable or
have only limited access to collection targets. Their information has little value
or credibility unless it can be corroborated by data from technical intelligence
sources. In short, human intelligence can help in some areas, but it will contrib-
ute little, or even make matters worse, unless there are major improvements in
the ability to focus and fuse all-source collection.
Similarly, “data mining”—software processes that locate items possibly re-
lated to subjects of interest in digital databases and fuse them into predictively
useful insights—can automate some aspects of intelligence collection and en-
able the intelligence community to make far better use of unclassified media and
certain other sources. It can also help recognize patterns in terms of indications
and warning. Data mining, however, is no substitute for analysis or for large ana-
lytic staffs. At present, it impresses the contractors and data systems experts that
promote it more than it assists intelligence analysts and military users.
Data-mining programs must be highly adaptable, easy to use, and constantly tai-
lored by experienced analysts to specific needs if they are really to help in the
transition from collection to analysis.
There is also a major disconnect that must be bridged between operations
and either collection or analysis. Afghanistan again showed that virtually all
low-intensity and asymmetric wars require both intelligence and military per-
sonnel on the ground to support targeting directly and to gain in real time infor-
mation that can contribute to operations. The United States was fortunate in
having recent special operations experience in Afghanistan, but it had only a
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very limited pool of other military and Central Intelligence Agency personnel
with such backgrounds; it almost certainly would have done better with more.
In short, improved intelligence performance requires improvements in five
areas: technical collection, processing and fusion, human intelligence, signals
intelligence, and clandestine operations. To improve any given area in isolation,
particularly at the expense of analysis, is no lesson of this war. It would be a rec-
ipe for almost certain failure.
However, it seems highly doubtful that improvements in intelligence can
markedly improve the prospect for warnings of future wars or major terrorist at-
tacks over what was possible before 11 September. The United States had long
seen al-Qa‘ida as an enemy and had blocked several previous attacks. The 11
September attacks succeeded because al-Qa‘ida changed its methods, produced
an unusually expert group of attackers, and was lucky. As has been noted previ-
ously, it seems likely that future attackers will also innovate and that some will be
highly professional, or at least lucky.
Ever since the beginning of the Cold War, the United States has conducted
postcrisis indications-and-warning reviews. Some have produced scapegoats,
and some have led to significant improvements in “I&W” capabilities. In gen-
eral, however, indications and warning analysis has simply kept pace with the
evolution of threat techniques. The probability that any post-Afghanistan im-
provement in indications and warning will be enough to prevent all future at-
tacks from succeeding is probably near zero.
Mission Effectiveness versus Mission Intensity: Offense versus Defense
“Closing the loop” in near-real-time intelligence, targeting, precision strike, as-
sessment and restrike may significantly improve U.S. military effectiveness in
ways that reduce the need for sheer numbers and limit the scale of most attacks.
Not only did airpower substitute in many ways for heavy ground forces, armor,
and artillery, but precision attacks and far better targeting produced results that
once required many more aircraft. This indicates that deploying even more effec-
tive real-time intelligence, targeting, and damage-assessment systems can either
make a given force more effective in battle or allow a reduction in force size and
mission intensity.18
There are potential countermeasures to such advances, however, and some of
them are all too familiar to enemies in the Middle East:
• A shift to more distributed forms of warfare, by which terrorists and other
opponents seek to present smaller targets
• Collocation of targets with civilians, to hide or shield operations, and
constant movement of assets to make them harder to target “by function”—
that is, to find them where they “would normally be”
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• Dispersion of assets before or during a conflict without giving normal
indications of the imminence of combat operations
• Distribution and combination of highly advanced surface-to-air missiles
like the SA-10 or SA-11, shorter-range systems, sensors, and command and
control links to make effective long-range air strike more difficult, and
• Creation of retaliatory forces with weapons of mass destruction that can be
launched on warning or under attack.
Even so, there are practical limits to the adaptiveness of enemy forces. Large
masses of armor, artillery, and combat aviation can scarcely be distributed; in-
deed, moving them may simply make them easier targets. Distributed forces are
weaker forces, and hiding among civilians is a two-edged sword—it may alienate
those among whom one hides. Also, highly sophisticated (and very expensive)
air defense systems can be countered with new targeting and strike technologies.
Finally, CBRN weapons are a credible deterrent only if they cannot be targeted
and it is clear that they would be used.
THE CHALLENGE OF FORCE TRANSFORMATION
Force transformation is still very much a work in process. The report of the Qua-
drennial Defense Review was issued in the late fall of 2001, before there was time
to react to the fighting in Afghanistan. It set six major goals for force transforma-
tion: protect the U.S. homeland and critical bases of operation; deny sanctuary
to enemies; project and sustain power in areas to which opponents had at-
tempted to deny access; leverage information technology; improve and protect
information operations; and enhance space operations. Planning and budgeting
documents since that time reflect both the department’s view of the initial les-
sons of Afghanistan and its conclusion that the U.S. experience in fighting ter-
rorism has validated many of the prescriptions of its transformation studies.
At the same time, the U.S. military posture in the Middle East must adapt to
one of the paradoxes inherent in President Bush’s fiscal 2003 budget request and
the new FY 2003–2007 Future Year Defense Program. Short of a major regional
war, the request probably represents the practical maximum that U.S. military
forces can expect for the foreseeable future—and the Congress may not fully
fund it. No service, however, has a viable modernization plan that can be carried
out within the planned funding level; military aviation in particular is heading
for a major crash.
Far too many expensive new programs are to be deployed in far too small a
time. The effects are critical for every service. The Navy’s shipbuilding program
continues a trend that, if pursued, will ultimately leave the United States with a
150-ship fleet. The Army has canceled eighteen programs for existing (“legacy”)
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forces; it has developed a family of light armored vehicles for its new light bri-
gade and thereby made that brigade too heavy to move by air; and it has pro-
duced no credible plan to fund and develop future combat systems. The Marine
Corps has given up firepower to keep three active divisions and lacks air and am-
phibious modernization plans for current funding levels. The Air Force is ada-
mant about the need for the F-22 air-superiority fighter while also needing to buy
the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35), replacement airlifters and tankers, and new UAVs.
If politics is the art of the possible, force planning is the art of the fundable.
No chief of staff, head of planning, or director of programming and budgeting
for any service has shown competence in this art. For all the past and current
successes of U.S. forces, and for all of the opportunities now available, any obser-
vations on force transformation should be prefaced with the caveat that in one
key dimension, U.S. military forces have not yet adapted to the evolving chal-
lenges in the Middle East.
The “Force Transformation PDM”
There are many positive trends and areas where action is taking place. While the
plans for many aspects of the force-transformation effort are not yet complete,
press reports indicate that Program Decision Memorandum 4 (the “Transfor-
mation PDM,” incorporated in the fiscal 2003 budget request) has called for:19
• Some two billion dollars for improved satellite communications, and
modifications and improvements, including security and survivability, to
the satellite-based Global Positioning System, and improvements in
space-based radars and imagery systems
• A major acceleration of unmanned combat vehicle programs and serious
examination of new programs to supplement or replace manned combat
aircraft; an AGM-114 Hellfire missile capability for the RQ-1 Predator;
examination of the option of arming UAVs with smaller (250–500 pound)
versions of the JDAM
• Many more RQ-1 Predators, RQ-4A Global Hawks, and unmanned aerial
vehicle-based intelligence and targeting systems, including possible
conversion of retired manned aircraft or older target drones to UAVs20
• Major improvements to the endurance, payload capability, sensors
(including electro-optics, infrared, and synthetic aperture radar),
downlinks, survivability, and launch/recovery systems of UAVs; possible
addition of UAVs to future maritime patrol aircraft21
• Procurement and improvement of Tomahawk cruise missile systems
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• Conversion of at least four more C-130s to gunships and improvements to
AC-130 special operations aircraft and other special warfare variants of the
C-130, including countermeasures to air defenses; improvement of their
video and infrared targeting and surveillance systems and fire control
capability; refinement of datalink systems between the AC-130 and
Predators and Global Hawks rushed into the field22
• Procurement and improvement of portable and theater-deployable
intelligence and targeting systems and of rear-echelon and national
capabilities
• Improvements in communications, secure data links, displays, weapons
dispensers, and precision weapons to make near-real-time targeting and
restrike capabilities more effective
• Acceleration of an airborne laser theater missile defense system
• Upgrade of North American Aerospace Defense Command computers and
radars
• Acceleration of hard-target and underground-facility-penetration weapons
• Acceleration of the development of unattended ground sensors and
“long-loiter” collection platforms to characterize and monitor activities
inside facilities.
The new weapons for use against hard and underground targets would re-
place or enhance the five-thousand-pound GBU-28 “bunker buster” bombs and
the AGM-130s used during the Afghan war. The Department of Defense esti-
mates that there are some ten thousand hard or buried targets (most twenty me-
ters or less underground) in the world, of which some one thousand are critical,
and that their number will advance steadily as improved tunneling equipment
becomes available. The United States is also examining ways to make its cruise
missiles capable of attacking hard targets. There are unconfirmed reports that
one such missile, the AGM-86D, was used in Afghanistan. Other options include
thermobaric weapons, the FMU-157 hard-target smart fuse, and the BLU-116B
advanced unitary penetrator warhead.23
The Force-Transformation Impact of the Fiscal Year 2003 Budget
The president’s FY 2003 budget request set forth a list of “force transformation
efforts” that affect U.S. military capabilities in the Middle East. They included:
• Conversion of four Trident submarines to cruise missile carriers
• Initial development of the DD(X) surface warfare ship, a test bed for future
Navy systems
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• Spending a billion dollars on research and procurement of unmanned
aerial vehicles and associated equipment, including seventy more Global
Hawks for the Air Force and twenty-eight for the Navy24
• Accelerating funding of research on the Global Hawk and the Navy’s Fire
Scout UAV, and on unmanned combat aerial vehicles; the request also
increases funding for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s
future UCAV program, with a deployment goal of 2015, and for unmanned
underwater vehicles
• Transformation of the old strategic nuclear triad—land-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles, manned aircraft, and submarine-launched ballistic
missiles; the new triad includes a scaled-down nuclear deterrent, a more
deadly and responsive conventional deterrent, and missile defense
• An overall procurement budget of about seventy-two billion; the Army is
set for $13.8 billion, the Navy/Marine Corps for $24.9 billion, the Air Force
for $27.3 billion; there is also $2.8 billion for Defense headquarters and
agency buys and a $3.2 billion Defense Emergency Response Fund
• Raising the budget for research, development, testing and evaluation to
$53.9 billion in fiscal 2003, up from $48.4 billion in 2002, and increasing
science and technology funding by a billion dollars to $9.9 billion, or 2.7
percent of the Defense budget
• Canceling the Navy DD 21 destroyer and Theater Area Missile Defense, the
Air Force Peacekeeper missile and, as noted, eighteen Army “legacy”
programs and retiring F-14 Tomcats, Vietnam-era UH-1 helicopters, and
Spruance-class destroyers unsuited to the transformation strategy, while
shifting almost ten billion dollars to other projects
• Providing for the Army’s Future Combat System, in addition to money for
Interim Armored Vehicles and continued development of the RAH-66
Comanche helicopter
• Funding two Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyers, a Virginia-class
attack submarine, a San Antonio–class amphibious transport dock ship, a
Lewis and Clark–class auxiliary ship, fifteen MH-60S helicopters, five E-2C
Hawkeye aircraft, and forty-four F/A-18E/F Hornet fighters, and
continuing to modernize the EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft
• Buying twelve more C-17 airlifters, one E-8C JSTARS aircraft, and
twenty-three F-22 Raptor fighters, and modernizing the B-2 Spirit bomber,
F-16 fighter-bomber, and the F-15E multimission fighter.
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Other Advances in Tactics and Technology
The United States also apparently intends to conduct a number of efforts in
other areas relevant to the Afghan-war experience:25
• Shortening the delay between real-time intelligence collection and
targeting by the “shooter” to no more than ten minutes
• Improving central planning and data-transfer facilities like the American
Joint Analysis Center at the Royal Air Force base at Molesworth to ensure
that the United States does not become overly dependent on regional
facilities like the Combined Air Operations Center in Saudi Arabia26
• Accelerating the development of systems to detect and characterize
biological and chemical weapons attacks
• Accelerating development of sea-based, wide-area missile defenses, and
selecting a suitable replacement for the EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft, as
part of a joint airborne electronic attack program
• Reexamining the value of weapons like the fifteen-thousand-pound
BLU-82 GSX-jellied “slurry” bomb in terms of hard-target kill and
psychological impact, or reweaponizing fuel-air explosive weapons like the
BLU-72
• Upgrading the communications, display, and munitions systems on
bombers and strike fighters to improve the ability to retarget and restrike
during the same mission
• Improving subsystems on the RC-135V RIVET JOINT signals intelligence
aircraft and the U-227
• Improving the JSTARS targeting software28
• Developing advanced targeting pods for existing aircraft, and built-in
systems for the Joint Strike Fighter
• Installing electronic and infrared intelligence sensors and other surveillance
systems on aircraft such as tankers
• Replenishing stocks of the GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition
(approximately 4,600 JDAMs were used out of an inventory of ten
thousand by December 2001)29
• Enhancing use of the wind-corrected munitions system, which was used in
the Afghan war to dispense combined-effects munitions like the CBU-130
more accurately
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• Completing development of the sensor-fused submunition with a smart
infrared-homing capability for antiarmor and antivehicle use, and giving
submunitions fail-safe options so that they do not remain “live” for
extended periods30
• Deploying a dedicated multisensor command and control aircraft by 2009
to support advanced closed-loop missions, especially involving stealth
aircraft like the F-22 and B-2A31
• Improving three-dimensional mapping and imagery to improve the
accuracy of GPS-guided weapons and determine proper angles of attack32
• Beginning development of an advanced, next-generation manned or
unmanned bomber capable of surviving extremely advanced
developmental surface-to-air defenses like the Russian S-400 Triumf
(SA-20)
• Revising the defense communications satellite system to handle far greater
traffic densities, integrate information systems, and standardize terminals
and downlinks at different echelons of access and security33
• Increasing communications, imagery, and targeting support to small,
scattered U.S. and allied ground units
• Improving the integration and user-friendliness of the National
Reconnaissance Office and National Security Agency data and systems used
to support operations, targeting, and surveillance.34
The United States does, however, face the practical problem of shaping these
transformation programs to reflect fully the experience of Afghanistan. It is nec-
essary not only to redefine missions and war plans but also to ensure that force
transformation does not ignore the war’s lessons regarding coalition warfare,
interoperability, basing and forward presence requirements, and power
projection.
LESSONS AND ISSUES
There are several other areas where important questions and answers seem to be
emerging as to how the United States should reshape its forces to fight in the
Middle East.
The Media and Psychological Operations
The Office of the Secretary of Defense feels that it did a much better job than in
earlier campaigns of dealing with the media and psychological dimensions of
the war in the West but that it was slow to focus on the regional media and deal
with psychological operations in the theater. It is not yet clear how the United
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States can improve its efforts to deal with regional media or strengthen and
modernize its psychological operations capabilities, but this seems to be a signif-
icant lesson and one the department will act upon over time.
The aborted Office of Strategic Influence was a clear recognition of the strate-
gic importance of psychological operations, although it is far from clear what
now will happen in this area. Whether the State Department and activities like
the Voice of America will carry out systematic “information” or propaganda ef-
forts to deal with the U.S. and foreign media and public opinion must now be
determined.35
U.S. Marine Corps, the Osprey, the AV-8B, and Nonlittoral Warfare
The Marine Corps faces a potential crisis over the reliability and cost of the Os-
prey, the readiness and effectiveness of the AV-8B Harrier, and the need to mod-
ernize many aspects of its transport helicopter, combat aviation, ground, and
amphibious systems. In spite of the increase in defense spending under the fiscal
2003–2007 program, it is not clear that the Marine Corps will get the funding it
needs to sustain air operations in a major regional contingency like Iraq. Some
long-overdue improvements, like adding the Litening 2 infrared targeting pod
to the AV-8B, will help in some ways—although they may not correct the air-
craft’s range, sustainability, and reliability problems.36
At the same time, Afghanistan raises the need to plan for more nonlittoral op-
erations and involving special warfare units with language, area, and advisory
expertise. The success of U.S. Special Forces, Ranger, and the Marine Corps units
in Afghanistan may well show that the “lessons”of Task Force HAWK (the failed at-
tempt to deploy AH-64 Apache attack helicopters for the Kosovo war in 1999)
may not be lessons after all but rather functions of political decisions and unique
training and readiness problems. Certainly, the Army’s ability to airlift and
drop more than two hundred Rangers and intelligence officers into Taliban-
controlled territory in Operation RHINO on 19 October 2001 indicates that such
assaults can be very effective. The same is true of the success of much larger U.S.
ground forces in the fighting around Shah e-kot and Gardez in March 2002.
There seems to be a good case for examining how force transformation and a
shift to longer-range strike and airmobile operations should affect the future of the
Marine Corps. In particular, programs ought to call for modernization of attack he-
licopter and airmobile forces and for improvements in the ability of Marine units to
conduct counterterrorism and asymmetric warfare missions—missions that seem
likely to be key aspects of future combat in the Middle East.
Carrier Operations, Cheap Cruise Missiles, and Naval Strike Power
Successful as Navy carrier operations were during the fighting in Afghanistan,
they were heavily dependent on Air Force aerial tanker assets based in Bahrain,
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Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Even during the Gulf War, ques-
tions arose about the need for longer-range carrier strike/attack aircraft that
could carry more weapons and deliver them with greater accuracy, thus reduc-
ing the burden on Air Force refueling assets and avoiding having to jettison un-
expended munitions or to return to the carrier with them still on board.
The Navy and Marine Corps need to examine closely the anticipated perfor-
mance of the Joint Strike Fighter in the light of this history, the mission require-
ments in the Middle East, and the possible reductions in the ability of the Air
Force to base tankers and other support aircraft forward in the Middle East in
their present numbers. Such a study is not likely to not cause radical changes in
the role of the aircraft carrier per se, but it will mean rethinking how these as-
pects of sea-based strike capabilities can be improved over time.
Here, closing the loop in terms of targeting and the ability to use airpower to
deliver precision-guided munitions effectively and with maximum strategic and
tactical impact seems to have even more value in carrier than in other air opera-
tions. There are limits to carrier sortie rates; the fact that three carriers together
sustained an average of fewer than seventy attack sorties per day during the peak
of the Afghan fighting is an illustration of this point. So is the fact that the U.S.
Navy flew 4,900 of the 6,500 strike sorties between 7 October and 17 December
2001, or 75 percent of the total, but delivered less than 30 percent of the ord-
nance. Comparisons of fighters to bombers may not be “fair,” but the issue is
mission capability, not aircraft type.
The fact remains that B-1s and “antique” B-52s from Diego Garcia flew only 10
percent of the missions but delivered 11,500 of the 17,500 weapons dropped—65
percent of all weapons delivered and 89 percent of those dropped by the Air Force.
The bombers dropped the vast majority of the 6,500 five-hundred-pound
“dumb” bombs used and roughly half of all the guided munitions.37 It is far from
clear that bombers could operate as easily in a less permissive air defense envi-
ronment, but the same is true of carrier strike aircraft.
The present delays in replacing the EA-6B, and what may be serious engine-
life problems for that aircraft, underline the need to rethink manned strike oper-
ations, if time over target and survivability rates achieved over Afghanistan are
to be repeated over states that, like Iraq, have dense surface-to-air missile assets
in at least certain areas or that, like Iran, may acquire such advanced systems as
the SA-400. Certainly, the near-impunity the AC-130 enjoyed over Afghanistan
may not exist in future contingencies in the Middle East.
Making individual sorties more effective is not only the most cost-effective
way of dealing with these limitations, but it is also the best way to reduce civilian
casualties and collateral damage, and to deal with steadily more complex asym-
metric wars. At the same time, the Afghan war again raises questions about the
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sheer cost of cruise missiles and, by extension, about the best way to arm the ar-
senal ship represented by the DDX. It is one of the ironies of the cruise missile
that, though the Navy needs more long-range strike assets, relatively few targets
merit strike systems that cost nearly a million dollars per round. The Navy
would seem justified in giving a very high priority to a cruise missile that costs
about one-fifth of that figure.
The Marine Corps, Army, and Maritime Prepositioning
Amphibious capability and maritime prepositioning may become even more
important in the Middle East in the future if the United States cannot obtain the
kind of support for coalition operations it needs from Egypt and the Gulf states.
The United States also faces a potential legal problem with respect to continued
British sovereignty over Diego Garcia. At the same time, as the Army lightens its
power projection forces, questions arise about the future composition and role
of the Marine Corps and the extent to which amphibious ships and preposition
ships should support a given mix of Marine Corps and Army forces.
These are scarcely issues that affect the Middle East alone, but any regional
force-planning exercise should examine transformation options for the overall
mix of Marine Corps and Army land forces; the possibility of standardization
between those two services in, for instance, light armored vehicles or artillery;
and new combinations of amphibious and maritime prepositioning capability
for the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf.
One case in point is the recent use of the carrier Kitty Hawk as a base for Army
Special Forces. The Key West Agreement of 1948 between the first secretary of
defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, defining the roles and missions of the ser-
vices, has no functional meaning today. If Army forces can make better use of
Navy platforms than the Marine Corps in any given contingency, they should do
so. Conversely, the United States should not pay to convert U.S. Army units to
light forces for missions that can be performed by restructured Marine Corps
forces for longer periods and with heavier equipment. Force-transformation ex-
ercises seem to avoid fundamental questions about the overall Army–Marine
Corps force mix. Afghanistan indicates that these questions need to be asked.
U.S. Army Light and Special Warfare Forces
Afghanistan also raises broad questions about the U.S. Army force mix and its
suitability and capabilities for future conflicts in the Middle East. While the
Afghan war is being used to justify the U.S. Army’s effort to transform its present
armored and mechanized power-projection forces into units that, with lighter
armor and artillery, can be moved and deployed more rapidly, it is far from clear
that the Afghan conflict really teaches this lesson or that even an increased level
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of defense spending would allow the U.S. Army to accomplish such a transfor-
mation on a timely basis.
The fiscal 2003 budget request does, however, encourage some important
programs and cancel others. It calls (as noted above) for procurement of 332 In-
terim Armored Vehicles and a new six-brigade force based upon twenty-ton
wheeled vehicles. One brigade is to be able to deploy anywhere in the world by
C-130 within four days; a four-brigade division is to be able to do so within
thirty days. (These goals would seem more innovative had not a similar plan
been discussed in the Army in 1974.)
The money the Army will spend on development of a Future Combat System
is to create a far more advanced, rapidly deployable set of ground forces—evi-
dently to be ready sometime after 2010. Other improvements will occur in me-
dium tactical vehicles, although the experience in Afghanistan indicates that
most of the 3,574 now in hand may be too heavy, too large, and lacking the
needed all-terrain mobility. Improvements will also be made to the AH-64A/D
attack helicopters.
At the same time, the endless “development” of the RAH-66 Comanche
reconnaissance/attack helicopter continues, and the Army will still spend a great
deal on older, heavy systems.38 Of the eighteen programs canceled for fiscal
2003–2006, some are heavy systems unrelated to the need for the kind of more
effective light forces demonstrated in Afghanistan. About half, however, are light
systems or programs, like the Battlefield Combat Identification System, that do
seem to mesh with the lessons of the conflict.39 The end result is that the Army
may well focus on a “future combat system” that is desirable but available too far
in the future to meet the need for interim systems over the next decade.
In contrast, the success of the U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division, Special
Forces, and Ranger units in Afghanistan argues a strong case for the expansion
of these kinds of forces, modernizing their equipment, and tailoring attack heli-
copter and airmobile forces for counterterrorism and asymmetric-warfare mis-
sions. There seem to be good reasons as well for reexamining the role that the
Central Intelligence Agency should play and the interface between the CIA and
special warfare forces.
The same is true of how special operations forces are commanded and inte-
grated into policy. At present, there appears to be a gap between the service com-
mands, the military commanders of special operations force, civilians in the
field of special operations and low-intensity conflict, and the policy offices un-
der the secretary of defense. It is plain that special operations forces are primarily
a tool for joint warfare, but someone needs to be put clearly in charge at the top.
The last thing on Earth that special warfare troops need is an overcomplicated or
overpoliticized chain of command.
C O R D E S M A N 1 0 7
36
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/3
GIVING NEW PRIORITY TO COUNTERPROLIFERATION
President Bush may have used remarkably awkward language in referring to Iran
and Iraq as parts of an “axis of evil,” but a poor word-choice does not mean that
proliferation will not pose a growing challenge to military operations in the
Middle East. Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Syria are all major proliferators; Algeria,
Libya, Egypt, and the Sudan are proliferators to a lesser degree.
The Changing CBRN Threat
The United States still has not determined the source of the anthrax incidents
that followed the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This
raises the prospect that states or other terrorists may piggyback on a conflict in
unpredictable ways and that future opponents may see a counterterrorism cam-
paign or an asymmetric war not as a deterrent but rather as an opportunity to
underscore vulnerability and to sow greater confusion.
It is now clear that al-Qa‘ida was making a major effort to develop chemical
and biological weapons and was examining nuclear terrorism—attacking nuclear
power plants, or using radiological weapons, or even detonating crude atomic
devices. It is possible that future terrorists will draw the lesson that if they can
launch only one major series of attacks against the United States, it should be
with weapons having the most horrific effects.
Middle Eastern states, on the other hand, may learn two lessons—the value of
helping proxies develop such weapons, and the advantage of holding those
weapons as deterrents in asymmetric wars. They may also judge that an ability to
threaten to use such weapons in attacks on U.S. allies and friends or targets in the
American homeland will either deter the United States or constrain its attacks
and goals in war.
The Limits of Arms Controls and Export Controls
Such a threat raises major new questions about arms control and existing arms
control agreements. It also points to the growing ability of Middle Eastern states
and terrorist groups to conduct anonymous attacks with highly lethal or eco-
nomically devastating CBRN weapons, like biological weapons. One lesson of
Afghanistan may be that future opponents could use smallpox or its equiva-
lent—which in turn raises the specter of dealing with anonymous attacks having
only economic impacts, like those of the hoof-and-mouth outbreak in Britain or
swine fever in Taiwan.
The discovery of a large-scale al-Qa‘ida effort to develop CBRN weapons—aside
from ongoing proliferation by nations like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea—under-
scores the steadily growing importance of offensive counterproliferation as well as
of defense. The threat of biological warfare is particularly serious, but the United
States and its allies need to rethink internal security for, public health responses
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to, and defenses against the broad range of CBRN threats. The recent episodes of
hoof-and-mouth disease and “mad cow” disease are almost models of how not
to deal with such attacks and warnings of how much more effort is needed.
Iraq is the main nation-state proliferator in the Middle East and one that il-
lustrates several aspects of the evolving threat. Iraq has shown that it will take
acute risks, escalate without warning, and actually use weapons of mass destruc-
tion. It set up a crude launch-on-warning/launch-under-attack arrangement
during the Gulf War. It converted a civilian pharmaceutical plant to the mass
production of anthrax weapons in a matter of months. It was able to conceal
many aspects of its CBRN and missile activities even when UN inspectors had
relatively great freedom of action, and since then it has had sufficient time to
hide and disperse its activities in ways that no future inspection effort is likely to
find.
Much of the debate over chemical warfare, biological warfare, ballistic missile
defense, and nuclear proliferation has failed to come to grips in a detailed way
with the threat of asymmetric attacks and terrorism; such debates have a tradi-
tion of focusing on large-scale conventional war fighting. The same has been
true of export controls. A joint and comprehensive review of how to change
arms control agreements and export controls—looking at the CBRN and ad-
vanced technology threat as a whole—is needed to develop a more effective
common strategy. While this is a global problem, it can only be solved one
proliferator at a time, and most proliferators are in the Middle East.
The Need for a New Type of U.S. Military Response
To deal with these challenges in the Middle East and elsewhere, the United States
must find approaches that recognize the new threats, offer new military options,
and blend conventional options with the kind of extended theater nuclear deter-
rence implicit in the new U.S. nuclear military strategy set forth in the Bush ad-
ministration’s Nuclear Posture Review.
Proliferation does not challenge any one service more than others, and
counterproliferation is inherently a joint mission. All of the U.S. military ser-
vices must give deterring, countering, defending against, and responding to the
threat of CBRN weapons a high and shared priority. As noted earlier, however, in
areas like sea-based theaterwide ballistic missile defense, the U.S. Navy may well
have unique capabilities. In other areas the Navy and Marine Corps may have
unique vulnerabilities; the vulnerability of ships to terrorist attacks using bio-
logical warfare has been recognized since the early days of modern biological
weapons, soon after the end of World War II.
Several challenges are clear. U.S. armed forces and American allies cannot
plan on having the initiative. They must expect to cope with enemies who will
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use first strikes, launch on warning, and launch under attack. They cannot count
on declarations of war, or even on knowing immediately who is responsible for
an attack. The method of attack may not be easy to discern; unconventional de-
livery systems are as likely as missiles.
Mixes or “cocktails” of biological agents may be particularly difficult to charac-
terize and treat. Defense and force-protection measures must be based on the full
range of direct and asymmetric threats. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps must
now face the challenge of advances in biotechnology and genetic engineering that
may radically ease the use, and increase the lethality, of biological weapons in a re-
gion where many countries have or are seeking to acquire such weapons.
Improved targeting, real-time intelligence, attack characterization, and battle
damage assessment pose ongoing challenges in conventional warfare; they are
much more severe when chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons
are involved. CBRN facilities, stockpiles, units, and delivery systems must be at-
tacked differently than conventional military targets—with a greater level of in-
tensity, in ways that minimize the risk of secondary effects, and with far greater
ability to assess damage and manage restrikes.
The Navy may have to play a role in regional response to attacks on ports or
land facilities. Rapid sea-based medical and emergency response may be the
only way of deploying such facilities on the scale needed, or of containing bio-
logical threats. At the same time, detecting the presence of CBRN weapons on
merchant ships or in the hands of potential terrorists is another problem, in
terms of protecting allied ships and inspecting ship movements. Finally, home-
land defense is not a luxury we can restrict to ourselves; we must be able to
protect our allies.
U.S. military planners have long recognized most of these challenges in some
form. They have already begun to address virtually all of the issues and options ad-
dressed in this article. There is no need to react to the challenges in the Middle East
by reinventing the wheel. U.S. military forces must, however, “refine the wheel,”
tailoring their planning, procurement, and operations to the evolving challenges
in the region and to the changing strategic priorities encountered there.
In this regard, the political complications of the new emphasis on terrorism
and asymmetric warfare reinforce a lesson of seapower that is as old as history.
The political, economic, and diplomatic dimensions of seapower are always as
important in the long run as the military dimension may be in the short run.
Seapower is a critical element of grand strategy in the broadest sense of the term,
even more so in a world that mixes growing global economic interdependence
with regional threats and tensions. It is most tempting to think of seapower
largely in narrow war-fighting terms, but in the Middle East such an approach
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would be a fine way to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. Worse, if it leads to
military unilateralism at the expense of partnership, it may be a powerful factor
in turning alliance into alienation. A truly broad understanding of seapower re-
veals that it is a great unifying force among those who resist the isolationism and
enmity of terrorism and similar weapons of the weak. The United States should
use its seapower wisely to sustain friendships around the world.
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